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GEORGE D. BROWN *
INTRODUCTION
The "third wave" of state school finance decisions continues, with
no apparent sign of abatement.' These cases—deriving important edu-
cational rights from state constitutions—are representative of the state
courts' new role as protectors of individual rights and liberties in areas
where federal judicial relief is not available. ) Within this overall con-
text, the recent Massachusetts discussion in McDufb v. Secretary of the
Executive Office of Educations is significant for several reasons. It adds
to the roster of school finance cases the prestige of a state supreme
court that has been in the forefront of the state constitutional revolu-
tion.' The opinion itself is a highly interesting example of state judicial
methodology, 5 particularly in its bold derivation of individual rights
and legislative duties from the education clause of the Massachusetts
f Copyright 9 1994, George D. Brown.
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1961, Harvard University; LL.B. 1965,
Harvard Law School.
Research for this Article was supported by a grant from the Boston College Law School
Dean's Fund. The author wishes to thank his colleagues for their helpful continents when an
early version of this Article was presented at a Boston College Law School Faculty Colloquium.
I See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation:
The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1994); Kate Strickland, The School
Finance Reform Movement, A History and Prognosis: Will Massachusetts Join the Third Wave of
Reform?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1105 (1991).
2 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HA RV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
3 615  N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
4 See Charles H. Baron, The Supreme Judicial Court in its Fourth Century: Meeting the Challenge
of the New Constitutional Revolution," 77 Mass. L. REV. 35 (1992).
5 See Thro, supra note 1, at 610.
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Constitution. 6 The opinion leaves no doubt that the current legislation
governing school finance is unconstitutional.
When it comes to the question of remedy, however, the McDuffy
court's boldness evaporates. A high degree of deference to the legisla-
ture is the dominant theme of this relatively brief portion of the
opinion.? The court comes close to saying that while it can say what is
wrong, only the legislature can fix it." This dissonance between right
and remedy is not unique to McDuffy. Other state supreme courts show
the same pattern of expansive declarations of right and duty coupled
with an insistence that solutions must come from the legislative rather
than the judicial branch.`'
This aspect of the state school finance cases is the subject of
increasing commentary."' In this Article, I offer a "federal courts"
perspective on what the state courts are doing. In examining the
remedial dimensions of the cases, I utilize a number of doctrines and
approaches developed by the United States Supreme Court to control
the exercise of federal judicial power. I also draw on the extensive body
of federal courts scholarship contrasting the capacities of state and
federal courts as protectors of individual rights and liberties. It is an
article of faith among many academic writers that the state courts
cannot perform this function as vigorously as their federal counter-
parts." This is the disparity thesis: the contention that inherent struc-
tural differences make the two sets of courts unequal in this area.' 2 At
first blush, school finance decisions like McDuffy can be seen as illus-
trations of the disparity thesis. The plaintiffs have come away from the
case with a nice sounding declaration, but the state judicial system has
essentially remitted them to the legislature which caused their problem
in the first place. The analysis offered here indicates, however, that the
lessons to be drawn from the school finance cases are considerably
more complex.
6 See McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass. 1993)
(quoting Education Clause of Massachusetts Constitution).
7 See infra notes 23-55 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
° See infra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
1 ° See, e.g., Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARV. L.
RE,v. 1072 (1991) [hereinafter Unfulfilled Promises]; but see, Thro, supra note I, at 604 (noting
recent tendency of state courts to be more assertive at remedial stage).
11 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1779-80
(1992).
12 Burt Neuborne proclaimed the classic statement of this thesis. See Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977).
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Section I of the Article describes the remedial dimensions of
McDuffi and discusses briefly other cases illustrating the same phe-
nomenon of merits boldness and remedial deference. 13
 Section II out-
lines the disparity thesis and discusses these decisions as possible illus-
trations of it." Particular attention is devoted to what advocates of
disparity cite as the phenomenon's main course: state judges' depend-
ence on the electorate for their positions and the resulting reluctance
to take politically unpopular stands.'' I contend that the classic dispar-
ity thesis does not explain the remedial deference of the school finance
cases. The positions taken on the merits of school finance suits are not
necessarily unpopular with the electorate, and remedial deference can
be found in the decisions of appointed judges such as those in Massa-
chusetts. A variant of the thesis may shed light, however. State supreme
courts are highly dependent on state legislatures—as opposed to the
electorate—for their salaries and budgets, if not for their jobs. More-
over, the two bodies find themselves in constant interaction, as ongo-
ing, equal partners in the state governmental process. Thus a state
court—unlike a federal court hearing a claim against state practices—
may well be reluctant to order its partner to take specific steps, includ-
ing the raising of revenue, to address educational inadequacies. There
is a limit to state court boldness; the disparity thesis seems to be
vindicated.
Section III sounds a cautionary note to this initial conclusion.' 6
The theme of judicial restraint is not limited to state courts. The
United States Supreme Court, particularly under Chief Justices Burger
and Rehnquist, has utilized a wide array of doctrines to circumscribe
federal judicial power. Issues such as standing, ripeness, political ques-
tions and remedial comity are central to any discussion of the proper
role of federal courts, especially in wide-ranging institutional litiga-
tion. 17
 What the state supreme courts are doing in the remedial com-
ponent of school finance litigation may well reflect the same concerns
that motivate the nation's highest court; both are engaged in the
process of circumscribing the judiciary's reformist role. In other words,
one should invoke a thesis of similarity rather than disparity.
Section IV takes the analysis a step further and advances the
contention that neither a disparity nor a similarity thesis explains fully
13 See infra notes 23-55 and accompanying text
"See infra notes 56-93 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 70-93 and accompanying text
16 See infra notes 94-156 and accompanying text.
17 See Abram Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 limtv. L. REV. 4, 11
(1982).
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the remedial dimensions of school finance cases.' 8 An alternative analy-
sis is that state courts, unconstrained by Article III of the United States
Constitution, are developing their own approaches to a particularly
complex form of institutional litigation. What the cases represent is
not so much a judicial "resolution" of a problem, but rather one step
in an ongoing approach to a multi-dimensional social question. The
state courts engage in a dialogue about that question with the political
branches almost to the point where they become partners in crafting
a solution. That solution does not come from the court nor is it
imposed by the court. Judicial decisions resemble a set of guidelines
for the next, legislative step in the process rather than judgments
designed to affect the rights and duties of a particular set of litigants.
The judicial decree is not, as in the federal norm, the "centerpiece"' 9
dictating who shall do what. The court does declare a duty, but its order
is essentially advice on how to the perform that duty. These binding
advisory opinions are quite different from the manner in which Article
III courts handle reform litigation. This does not mean that the state
approach is inferior.
One way of looking at the differences between the two judicial
systems is that they represent Justice Brandeis' "laboratory" theory of
federalism" at work. The various courts approach their possible refor-
mist role in different ways. What emerges is an exchange of views not
just within each state but among the states as well as between the state
and federal judiciaries. Beyond any specific subject matter such as
school finance is the broader question of the proper role of courts in
a democratic society. Our society now relies on courts for more than
just the resolution of simple bipolar disputes such as Mar&ury v. Madi-
son. 21
 This change has produced questions of effectiveness as well as
legitimacy: Can courts produce social change even if the validity of the
effort is accepted?
The school finance cases offer one set of answers in one context.
It may be that the state courts themselves will move beyond a posture
of remedial deference and will take direct charge of all aspects of the
matter22
 in a way that makes them look like a federal district court in
a desegregation case. For the moment, however, they offer a different
vision.
38 See infra notes 157-80 and accompanying text.
19 Abram Chayes, The Role of the fudge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. Ruv. 1281,1298
(1976).
20 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262,310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21 See s U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
sx See Lewis B. Kaden, Court and Legislatures in a Federal System: The Case of School Finance,
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I. MCDUFFY AND THE PHENOMENON OF REMEDIAL DEFERENCE
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's analysis in McDuffy
v, Secretary of the Executive Office of Education proceeds in three distinct
phases. Most of the opinion is devoted to a painstaking, largely histori-
cal exegesis of the education clause of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion.23 Based on this analysis, the court concluded that this clause
imposes on the political branches an enforceable:
duty to provide an education for all [Massachusetts] children,
rich and poor, in every city and town of the Commonwealth
at the public school level, and that this duty is designed not
only to serve the interests of the children, but, more funda-
mentally, to prepare them to participate as free citizens of a
free State to meet the needs and interests of a republican
government, namely the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."
The court then turned to the facts of the case before it. McDuffy
was an action by students in sixteen separate school districts against
state-level education officials.25 The opinion examined the array of
state statutes governing public education and concluded that, despite
an extensive local role, the cities and towns act as delegates and the
state retains the "ultimate responsibility" for educating the public. 26
The court then concluded, in almost cursory fashion, that the record
before it demonstrated the State's "failure to educate the children in
the plaintiffs' schools and those they typify."21 This analysis was based
on brief references to stipulations and affidavits concerning the sub-
standard conditions in the sixteen districts and the considerably greater
opportunities available in three wealthy districts used for comparison. 28
A majority of the justices concluded that what the plaintiffs were get-
ting in their school districts did not rise to the level of an "education." 28
Having established that there was a duty to educate and that for the
plaintiffs this duty was not being met, the court turned to the question
of remedy. This portion of the opinion is also surprisingly brief." Much
11 I-IOFSTRA L. REV. 1205,1255-59 (1983) (advocating greater judicial involvement); 'nun, supra
note 1, at 604 (noting recent tendency of state courts to he more assertive at remedial stage).
23 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
24 McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,548 (Mass. 1993).
25 Id. at 517-18 (outlining procedural history of case).
25 Id. at 553.
27 See id. at 552.
28 Id. at 553,
29 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 553-54.
3° See id. at 554-56.
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of it is devoted to quoting the broad guidelines which the Supreme
Court of Kentucky has promulgated to determine whether a school
system is producing educated children. 31 After noting that the means
of achieving such goals will "evolve together with our society," 32 like
other constitutional provisions whose impact changes over time, the
court "le[ft] it to the [Executive] and the Legislature to define the
precise nature of the task which they face in fulfilling their constitu-
tional duty to educate our children today, and in the future.""
The opinion indicates that the Legislature must act. There is an
insistence that "it is the responsibility of the Commonwealth to take
such steps as may be required in each instance effectively to devise a
plan and sources of funds sufficient to meet the constitutional man-
date."34 There are clear intimations of future judicial intervention if
the Legislature does not move on the matter." Still, the overall thrust
of the opinion is one of guidance rather than direction. The Legisla-
ture is under a duty to furnish education. Specific conditions such as
unsafe schools or inadequate science education indicate that that duty
is not being met. The broad Kentucky guidelines—such as "sufficient
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural heritage""— give a general, aspirational idea of how to meet
it. Beyond that, however, the Legislature is to decide what to provide
and how to pay for it. Not only does the court refrain from telling the
Legislature what to do, but it gives the clear impression that almost any
legislative action will be viewed as compliance.
This dichotomy between the right/duty component and the re-
medial dimension of the opinion is not unique to AlcDufbi. It can be
found, in varying degrees, in many of the state supreme court opinions
declaring existing school finance schemes unconstitutional. These courts,
relying primarily on the education clauses of their state constitutions,
have not hesitated to find broad legislative duties to provide educa-
tion." At the remedial stage, however, the tone changes sharply. Ac-
cording to one commentator:
31 See id. at 554 (quoting Ruse v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky.
1989)).
32 1d. at 555.
" Id.
34 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555-56.
"The court stated that "[n]o present statutory enactment is to be declared unconstitutional,
but the single justice may, in his or her discretion, retain jurisdiction to determine whether, within
a reasonable time, appropriate legislative action has been taken." Id. at 556.
36 Id. at 554 (quoting Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212).
37 See Thro, supra note I, at 604.
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[w] hen the courts have found a violation of the state consti-
tution, they have turned the task of formulating a proper
remedy over to the legislature without so much as maintain-
ing jurisdiction to oversee the process."
This seems an overstatement. Some courts have retained jurisdic-
tion." Others have imposed deadlines and made it clear that the
educational process will come to a halt unless the judicial mandate is
obeyed.4° But even in such cases there is considerable question as to
what that mandate is beyond a duty to do something. Indeed, individ-
ual justices have called on their colleagues to spell out the contours of
that duty.'" Instead of taking that step, the courts offer a form of
guidance. They seem to see the judicial role in these cases as confined
essentially to the articulation of general principles. 42 One reason for
this level of generality is the focus by several courts on inequalities and
inadequacies within the state system as a whole' Even in McDuffy,
while conditions in specific districts provided a springboard for a call
to action, the court's message to the Legislature was that it should
attack the problem on a statewide basis.
Speaking in generalities and granting deference to the legislature
may have its limits, however. One circumstance that could put this
judicial attitude to the test is inaction or insufficient action on the
legislature's part. The situation in New jersey is illustrative. That state's
supreme court has called for school finance reform in a series of
decisions dating back to 1973." The Legislature has at times been slow
to act; in other instances, it has passed reforms that do not seem
responsive to the concerns expressed by the court. On two occasions,
the court stepped in forcefully: once in 1975, ordering a redistribution
of school aid funds, 45 and again in 1976, enjoining the operation of all
schools until the Legislature took further action. 46 However, the court
38 Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform Cases:
Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAN D. L. RD/. 129, 156 (1992),
"See, e.g., Helena Elementary Sch. Dist v. State of Montana, 769 1'.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
41) See. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215.
41 Id. at 216,
42 See Mt:Duffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2(1 516, 554 n.92 (Mass.
1993) ("Ultimately, the courts of our sister states] left the task of defining the specifics of their
state's educational systems to their legislative and administrative bodies."); Washakie County Sch.
Dist. No. E v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 336 (Wyo. 1980).
43 Sre Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 156 (Tenn. 1993); Rose, 790
S.W.2d at 212; Waslurkie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 606 P.2d at 332.
44 See generally Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 10.
45 See Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975) [hereinafter Robinson 11].
46 See Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976) [hereinafter Robinson III].
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has shied away from decreeing with specificity the elements of a long-
term, constitutionally acceptable plan. 47 Returning to the fray in 1990,
the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Abbott u Burke, was much more
specific about what was wrong with the existing scheme and how to fix
it, 48
 Even this opinion, however, continued to sound strong themes of
remedial deference.49
This dissonance between right and remedy has stirred strong
criticism from within and without the judiciary. Through much of New
Jersey's long-running saga, Justice Pashman rebuked his colleagues for
becoming a "party" to the constitutional wrong," and called on the
court to "completely remedy" the violations found. 51 A recent academic
commentary labels the courts as "complicit actors in the unsatisfactory
remedies for school finance inequity"" and decries "unwarranted ju-
dicial deference to the political branches in the remedial phase ....""
At the heart of such critiques is the view that a court is not performing
the whole judicial function when it "stops short" of the remedial
dimension of a case.54 Thus, Professor Lewis Kaden, in a landmark
analysis of the school finance cases, contends that the judicial mandate
to explain the meaning of a constitution includes the duty to identify
a remedy for violations which a court has found." To the extent that
these criticisms have merit, they evoke the question whether there is
something intrinsically wrong with state courts that leads them to fail
to perform an important part of their duty in such a significant area
of litigation.
II. STATE SCHOOL FINANCE CASES AND THE DISPARITY
THESIS—ANOTHER VALIDATION?
At least one critic has concluded that the remedial deference
under discussion here is due in part to the nature of state courts."
These courts are presented as encountering serious difficulties, not
faced by federal courts, when cases before them present claims of
47 See Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 10, at 1075-78.
43 See 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
49 See id. at 410.
5° See Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2cl 6,10 (N.J. 1975) (Pashman, J., dissenting) [hereinafter
Robinson 1.1.
51 See Robinson II, 351 A.2d 713,734 (NJ. 1975) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
52 See. Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 10, at 1088.
53 See id. at 1072.
54 See. Kaden, supra note '22, at 1256-57.
55 See id. at 1244.
56 See iti. at 1235-44.
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individual rights which would require overturning the results of state
governmental processes. This analysis of the school finance cases may
represent a significant validation of one of the fundamental tenets of
mainstream federal courts scholarship: the disparity thesis." Advocates
of this thesis contend that the state courts' ability to handle some
matters impartially and fairly is suspect, and that in such cases the
federal courts must be available as an alternative. The contention is an
old one, found as early as the Federalist Papers:" It. clearly underlies
the grant of diversity jurisdiction in the original Constitution,'`' and is
implicitly present whenever federal courts are assigned a class of cases
which state courts might normally he expected to handle.
In recent years, the debate over this issue has focused on cases
presenting claims of individual rights and liberties against state govern-
ments and on the arguments advanced by Professor Burt Neuborne
in his celebrated article, The Myth of Parity.° Neuborne pulled no
punches. In his view, "the only judicial forums in our system capable
of enforcing countermajoritarian checks in a sustained, effective man-
ner are the federal courts." 6 ' Neuborne wrote to refute the Burger
Court's emerging emphasis on judicial comity62 between the federal
and state courts based on its willingness to see the two sets of courts as
"functionally interchangeable for urns likely to provide equivalent pro-
tection for federal constitutional rights."0"
Neuborne based his analysis on three institutional factors differ-
entiating the state and federal courts: technical competence; psycho-
logical set; and, insulation from majoritarian pressures. With respect
to competence, he emphasized the complex nature of contemporary
constitutional litigation and factors such as judicial selection process,
caseload and support staff, all of which work to make federal courts
more capable of dealing with such cases than their state counterparts. 64
57 See id. For a general discussion of this thesis and some implications for federal courts
scholarship, see Symposium, Federalism and Parity, 71 R.U. L. REV. 593, 593-664 (1991).
"Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Cmpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Triai, 113 U. PENN. L. REV.
793, 802 (1965).
"U.S. CoNsT. art. Il 1, 4 2.
6° See Neuborne, .supra note 12; Adam S. Cohen, More Myths of Parity: Slate Court Forums
and Constitutional Actions for the Right to Shelter, 38 EMORY L.J. 615, 646 n.173 (1989) (most
academic commentators follow Neuborne in rejecting notion of parity).
111 Neuborne, supra note 12, at 1131.
62 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (elaborating doctrine of federal court
abstention based on principles of comity and federalism).
53 Neuborne, supra note 12.
64 Id. at 1121-24.
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As for psychological set, Neuborne contended that "a series of psycho-
logical and attitudinal characteristics renders federal judges more likely
to enforce constitutional rights rigorously." 65 He cited the federal judi-
ciary's "elite tradition,"' receptivity to United States Supreme Court
pronouncements,67 and "ivory tower" detachment from "distasteful and
troubling fact patterns which can really test abstract constitutional
doctrine and foster a jaded attitude toward constitutional rights."fie In
an analysis that would bring joy to the hearts of Rush Limbaugh and
his followers, Neuborne celebrated "class-based predilections favorable
to constitutional enforcement" 69 more likely to be found in the federal
than state courts.
Although these two components of his analysis are certainly pro-
vocative, the most influential dimension of Neuborne's article has
been his emphasis on the federal courts' insulation from majoritarian
pressures as compared to their state counterparts. He began with the
following observation, central to most contemporary writing about
judicial review in a democratic society: A court presented with a con-
stitutional claim against a result reached by an organ of government
is being asked to substitute its judgment for that of the other body."
If the initial decision maker is selected through democratic means, the
court is engaging in a countermajoritarian exercise of power. Neub-
orne viewed the state judiciaries as less willing and able to perform this
task because of the influence on them of the very processes they
would have to review. 7 ' Although he refers in general terms to a com-
parison of "the institutional structure"72 of the two systems, the only
specific difference that he discusses is the fact that most state judges are
elected." Federal judges enjoy life tenure and other protections under
Article III of the United States Constitution. 74 In Neuborne's view, this
"insulation from political pressures" 75 represents a fundamental insti-
tutional difference, explaining the "historical preference for federal
65 1d. at 1124.
"fi ld.
67 Id.
66 NelibOrtle, supra note 12, at 1125.
69 Id. at 1126.
7" Id. at 1127.
71 Id. at1I27-28.
72 Id. al 1127 (emphasis added).
" Ne tibo rn e, supra note 12, at 1127-28.
74 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 rile judges of both the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold
their offices during good behavior ....").
7-'Neuborne, supra note 12, at 1128.
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enforcement of controversial constitutional norms," 76 Subsequent writ-
ers who have accepted the disparity thesis and applied it to various
jurisdictional issues have focused primarily on the issue of insulation
and, in particular, on state judges' dependence on the electoral proc-
ess."
Does the extent of remedial deference in the school finance cases
bear out the disparity thesis? There are several reasons for an affirma-
tive response. It is easy to focus on the rights components of these
decisions and to view them as examples of the state constitutional
revolution. It is important, however, not to lose sight of the linkage
between right and remedy. An ineffective, hortatory remedy, or a
failure to provide one at all, can dilute or even nullify the right that
the state court has boldly declared. The remedy puts the rights com-
ponent in perspective, lending support to Neuborne—like doubts about
state courts as rights protectors. The fact that the rights in question
are derived from state rather than federal constitutional sources does
not change the analysis. The underlying issue is whether state courts
can protect individual rightholders from denials at the hands of ma-
joritarian political processes. The school finance cases can be viewed
as resulting from situations in which the political processes are incapa-
ble of protecting the asserted rights. 78 Such situations present a classic
justification for rigorous judicial review. 79 The cases cast doubt on the
state courts' ability to provide it.
Still, the fit with Neuborne's analysis is not perfect. He focused on
the differences between state and federal trial courts, and expressed
ambivalence as to whether his thesis extended to state appellate courts. 8°
The school finance decisions have come primarily from these tribunals.
Thus, Neuborne's analysis of structural differences at the trial court
level may be inapplicable. Moreover, remedial deference can be found
in the decisions of appointed state supreme court justices such as those
in Massachusetts and New Jersey, who benefit from the political insu-
lation which Neuborne advocated. Perhaps the strongest argument
against applying Neuborne's analysis to the school finance cases is that
76 1d.
77 See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. R.Ev. 651, 652 (1991); Michael
Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal
Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 613 (1991).
78 See Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 10, at 1078-81.
79 The best known exposition of this justification is found in the works of Professor John Ely,
in notably his seminal book, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
Neuborne, supra note 12, at 1116 n.45.
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the rights enumerated in those cases may not represent a politically
unpopular position. Being for "better schools" and "educational re-
form" can put public officials in a favorable light, particularly if they
do not have to pay for the changes. 81 It is hard to see school finance
decisions provoking the sort of electoral wrath such as the decisions
on criminal cases that led to the removal of former California Chief
Justice Rose Bird."
At this point, I wish to propose an alternative disparity thesis that
may help explain the remedial deference in the school finance cases.
This alternative thesis is that the state supreme courts are, indeed,
fearful of the political consequences of ordering explicit remedies, but
the consequences are those that flow from a direct confrontation with
the legislature. The remedies called for by critics would require a court
either to substitute itself for the legislature, or to order the legislature
to take affirmative steps in the volatile and sensitive area of taxa-
tion and expenditure. One set of consequences might well be retali-
ation.
Whether or not state judges owe their jobs to the voters, they owe
their budgets to the legislatures. Professor Martin Redish, in a recent
application of the disparity thesis, speculates that state judges may fear
legislative reduction of their salaries. 83 A more realistic fear may be that
an unhappy legislature may simply refuse to grant increases, letting
judicial compensation lag behind inflation. 84 Apart from concern about
their own salaries, state supreme court justices are likely to take an
intensely proprietary interest in legislative funding for the entire judi-
cial branch. Pet projects such as data processing systems and court-
house upgradings could easily fall victim to interbranch conflicts!' The
risk of retaliation is not limited to the fiscal field, however. In 1992, for
example, the Massachusetts Legislature passed a comprehensive court
reform package.86 There was widespread speculation that provisions
8I At. the present time, Congress is considering proposals, based in part on suggestions by
President Clinton, to increase the national role in education reform. See Editorial, A New Federal
Role in Education Reform, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, at B8.
82 See Redish, supra note 11, at 1781.
83 Id. at 1779-80.
84 Scott Lehigh „fudges Press for Hike in Pay, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1994, at 21 (article based
on letter from Massachusetts' top judges to Governor noting that state's judges have received no
raise since 1988 and warns of judicial exodus); Doris Sue Wong, Politics May Stall Judges' Pay
Raise, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 1993, at 56.
85 See Gregg Krupa, Besieged Courts Aided by Reform, Justice Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16,
1994, at 30 (ChiefJustice of Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court cites inadequate financing for
the computerization of state court records).
86 1992 Mass. Acts 379.
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concerning administrative authority were crafted so as to punish the
state's Chief Justice for putting too much pressure on the Legislature."
Apart from any fear of retaliation, there is another set of reasons
why a state supreme court may wish to avoid a direct confrontation
with its legislature over school finance remedies. The two branches are
close working partners in the ongoing give-and-take of state govern-
ment and politics. Some state courts render advisory opinions to the
legislature." Others find themselves serving frequently as umpires in
disputes between the executive and legislative branches." On an infor-
mal level, members of all three branches tend to come from the same
political class and frequently have served together in one or more
capacities. The result can be a sense of common enterprise with un-
derstood, if undelineated, roles and limits. It is very hard to imagine
a state supreme court (not to mention a trial court) holding legislators
in contempt for failing to pass a school finance bill. 9° In sum, an
alternative statement of the disparity thesis may explain why state
courts are reluctant to enter this particular thicket.
Of course, it may well be unfair to apply the Neuborne analysis,
and its comparison with federal courts, to the state school finance
cases. These cases may present such unique problems as to be sui
generic. The subject matter is complex and does not lend itself to easy
answers. Decreeing statewide school finance reform is far different
from desegregating a school system or upgrading a prison. These
arguments have force. Some of them surface in the United States
Supreme Court's decision to keep school finance litigation out of
federal courts. 91
 On the other hand, it is possible to see the school
finance cases as another, albeit complex, form of institutional litiga-
tion.92
 In this view, the remedial issues do not lie outside the realm of
87 See Toni Lucy, Legal Minds Assess Court Reform Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7, 1993, at 27
("The bill represents numerous political compromises and jabs particularly at the Supreme
Judicial Court and its Chief Justice, Paul Liacos."),
88 P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. MELTZER, D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 70 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER],
89
	 e.g., MacManus v. Love, 499 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1972) (suit by legislators challenging
governor's veto of bill).
90 1n Spallone v. U.S., 493 U.S. 265 (1990), the Supreme Court reviewed a decision ()la federal
district court which held city counselors in contempt for failing to take specific steps to remedy
segregated housing. For a discussion of Spa/tone, see infra notes 144-50, 155-56.
91
 San Antonio [Jlep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1075). In Rodriguez, the
Court stated that "the justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local
problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition
of public revenues," Id. at 41. The Court also noted the "complexity" of school finance issues and
the lack of judicial "specialized knowledge and experience ... ." Id, at 42.
52
 See, e.g., Kaden, supra note 22, at 1244-50.
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judicial competence. Those who want the state courts to do more can
certainly find in the disparity thesis an explanation for the current
state of affairs.93 Implicit in this position, however, is the assumption
that the federal courts would do something quite different. As the
next section demonstrates, federal cases cast doubt upon this assump-
tion.
III. STATE COURTS, FEDERAL COURTS, AND THE. PURSUIT OF
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT —THE SIMILARITY THESIS
One of the striking aspects of the state school finance decisions is
the widespread citation of United States Supreme Court precedents.
Marbury v. Madison" is invoked by many state supreme courts to justify
the exercise of judicial power to invalidate existing legislation. 95 Several
of the cases contain extensive treatments of the federal political ques-
tion doctrine.96 The state courts rely on decisions such as Baker v. Cari47
and Powell v. McCorntack98 in discussing whether school finance repre-
sents an area which is beyond the reach of the judicial power. 99 The
general conclusion is that it is not." The implicit message of all these
citations is that the two sets of courts are engaging in a common
enterprise: entering politically sensitive waters to render justice to
litigants who invoke the court's power, even though the case presents
broad issues of structural reform.
As the analysis in Section II suggests, however, the two systems can
be seen as diverging sharply at the remedial phase. The state courts
defer to the legislature to provide the remedy. Federal courts also defer
to state and local institutions to provide the remedy in the first in-
stance. 10 ' But if these authorities fail to do the job, the federal courts
will step in and do it for them." A central tenet of federal constitu-
tional doctrine is that, once invoked, "the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
93 See Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 10, at 1083-85 (citing majoritarian constraints on state
courts).
94 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
55 See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,555 (Mass.
1993) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
26 See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 s State of Washington, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
97 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
98 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
99 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2(1 713,718 (NJ. 1975).
"9 But see, Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 126 (Rossellini, J., dissenting) (applying Baker
criteria to find political question).
1 °1 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,281 (1977) [hereinafter, Milliken II].
102 Id.
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flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."" It is this willingness
to have the federal courts step in and formulate a decree that becomes
the "centerpiece" of the controversym that seemingly takes these courts
far beyond where their state counterparts dare to tread.
Supreme Court precedents are not monolithic, however. The Court,
under Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, has been deeply con-
cerned about the role of the courts in a democratic society and about
delineating the limits of judicial power. The state courts' extraordinary
deference to the legislative branch in remedying school finance issues
may well reflect similar concerns. Examination of recent Supreme
Court precedents in a number of areas shows just how strong these
concerns are at the national level. It also suggests that different courts
may demonstrate these concerns in dealing with different aspects of
particular cases: whether to remedy a violation; how to limit that
remedy; and, whether to take the case at all. Judicial restraint, analysis
shows, is in ample supply at both levels.
The Supreme Court's concern with limiting judicial power has
manifested itself primarily in the area of standing. The cases cover a
wide range of issues and concerns." Particularly relevant to this Article
are two decisions in which the Supreme Court has invoked standing
to support a narrow judicial role in cases seeking broad-based institu-
tional reform. Allen v. Wrightm involved a challenge to Internal Reve-
nue Service rules and practices concerning private schools allegedly
operating on a discriminatory basis. The Court denied standing to
minority plaintiffs who sought to bring a nationwide class action. An
important element of the majority's analysis is that the plaintiffs' asser-
tion of harm would, if accepted, "pave the way generally for suits
challenging, not specifically identifiable violations of law, but the par-
ticular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obliga-
tions. "107
The Court found in the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers serious structural barriers to any such attempt to use the courts
"to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive
Branch to fulfill its legal duties." As Justice Stevens pointed out in
dissent, this analysis seems sharply at variance with the Court's appar-
1 °Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of blue., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
1 U4 See (Mayes, supra note 19, at 1298.
105 See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley
Forge, 61 N.C. L. REV. 798 (1983).
106 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
11)7 Id. at 759.
108 1x1. at 761.
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ent acceptance of a broad judicial role in cases involving school deseg-
regation and re-appointment.m" Nonetheless, a majority returned to
this theme in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,"° and denied standing in
a case which it characterized as challenging a "generalized level of
governmental action . . . .""'
An important theme of these cases is the desire to keep the federal
courts out of the role of "continuing monitors"" 2 of governmental
activity, a role which is central to most institutional litigation. The same
concern was at work in Gilligan v. Morgan which provides a significant
articulation of the political question doctrine."' In Gilligan, plaintiffs
sought federal court review of the training, weaponry and orders of
the Ohio National Guard following the tragic events at Kent State
University in 1970. Five Justices viewed the matter as a nonjusticiable
political question." 4 The two opinions taking this position focused on
the undesirability of a federal court assuming an ongoing supervisory
role over the defendants' activities."' The same Justices, however, in-
sisted that the federal courts might be open to more narrowly focused
suits seeking damages or injunctive relief."'
This preference for the narrowly drawn lawsuit was even more
visible in the controversial decision of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons." 7 In
that case, the Court held that an attempt to secure injunctive relief
against a police practice of using chokeholds did not present a case or
controversy, even though brought by a plaintiff who had been subject
to 4. 118 The Court noted that any claims as to the future were not yet
ripe, and that any attempt to seek an injunction based on the past
occurrence ran afoul of the mootness doctrine."' The Court empha-
sized that the plaintiff's damages claim for that occurrence was within
Article III. 120 The articulation of this preference took place against
the backdrop of an important academic discussion of the changing
nature of litigation. Many observers have noted the courts' movement
away from deciding only bipolar lawsuits which Marbury v. Madison
II/9 1d. at 792 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
I" Id. at 2140.
112 Id. at 2145.
113 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
" 4 Id. at 10.
"5 1d. at 10,13.
/d. at 11-12,14.
"7 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
118 /d. at 105.
"9 id. at 105-1(1, 111-13.
110 1d. at 111.
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typifies. 12 ' The reformist, institutional litigation which has become so
important in the federal courts presents three novel elements: an
acceptance of the "public action" in which citizens challenge the legal-
ity of government conduct; a view of the judicial role in which articu-
lation of public values becomes as important as dispute resolution; and,
an increasingly managerial role for trial courts at the remedial stage. 122
Despite widespread academic approval of these developments, a
"conservative" court might well have reservations. judicial power, espe-
cially the power to strike down statutes, derives its legitimacy from the
court's authority to decide cases and to apply to them all applicable
sources of law.'" Once judges move beyond bipolar disputes to broader
issues of social policy, the defense of legitimization through adjudica-
tion becomes attenuated even as the need for it increases. In Lujan,
Justice Scalia utilized a discussion of standing to invoke the bipolar
Marbury model as delineating the sphere of judicial competence."'"
Courts are to "decide on the rights of individuals;" the political branches
are the ones concerned with the public interest.' 25 The conservative
Justices were not of one mind on this point. Justice Kennedy pointed
out that "[ni] odern litigation has progressed far from the paradigm of
Marbury suing Madison to get his commission or Ogden seeking an
injunction to halt Gibbons' steamboat operations."' 26
Of particular concern to conservatives is the power of a decision
in one case to affect large numbers of people. Chief Justice Rehnquist
has explained the concept of standing as reflecting, in part, "a due
regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be most directly
affected by a judicial order." 127 Restricting the scope of lawsuits can be
seen as limiting the reach of judicial power to a small group of people
directly affected by a particular case and able to participate in it. fustice
Kennedy developed this concept at length in his separate opinion in
Missouri v. fenkins, 128 a case involving the power of federal courts to
order governmental bodies to levy taxes. He saw the imposition of taxes
as beyond the judicial power and a violation of the due process rights
of persons not before the court. For Kennedy, "[t] he exercise of judi-
121 See generally Chayes, supra note 19; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Prot: Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
122 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 88, at 79-82,
123 This, of course, was the rationale in Marbury itself. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
129 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992).
125/d .
126 Id. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
128 see 495 U.S. 33, 58 (1990).
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cial power involves adjudication of controversies and imposition of
burdens on those who are parties before the Court." 129 A taxation
order, by contrast, "has the purpose and direct effect of extracting
money from persons who have had no presence or representation in
the suit."'" Legislatures can levy financial burdens because the affected
taxpayers have consented to be represented through the legislative
process.' 3 '
These efforts to limit judicial power through limiting the scope of
adjudication may seem artificial. The decision in any case of A v. B can
lay down a rule governing millions of people. Remedial orders in cases
involving schools and other institutions have an obvious impact on the
public treasury. Conservatives might respond that that is an important
reason for setting limits on institutional litigation. Indeed, academic
analysts of these suits have identified the question of representation of
affected people at the remedial stage as a major problem.'" The state
courts may be responding to similar concerns in the school finance
cases. By leaving all remedial issues to the legislature, they attempt to
keep the judiciary out of the most political phase of the litigation. On
a more general level, the state courts may, like the Supreme Court, be
concerned with the outer limits of the judicial function. The extensive
discussions of political question issues show an awareness that they are
approaching these limits. One state court justice even discussed the
academic treatment of institutional litigation in federal courts to bol-
ster his contention that the school finance cases go too far.'" True, the
state courts take the cases, but remedial deference can be an effective
means of tempering this boldness. Thus we see concerns about judicial
restraint manifesting themselves in both systems.
When looking for similarities between the two systems, it is also
important to remember that the subject of school finance represents
an area which the United States Supreme Court has been extremely
reluctant to enter. The main reason state courts are hearing these cases
is that the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,' 34 in 1973, established that such cases present no
federal question. The Rodriguez opinion expressed great concern
129 Id. at 66.
' 3° Id.
" I Id.
"2 See Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in
Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. RYA,. 43 (1979).
1 "Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 898 (W. Va. 1979) (Neely, J., dissenting) (citing Chayes,
supra note 19).
154 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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about the complexity of educational finance issues and about the
desirability of leaving them to state political processes.' 35 The Court has
reiterated these themes in the context of desegregation litigation.' 36
School finance cases can take courts beyond education questions into
multi-faceted issues of metropolitan equity and inter-jurisdictional re-
distribution of resources and opportunities.' 37 These too are matters
which the Supreme Court has kept away from the federal judiciary.' 38
Some Supreme Court cases provide support, albeit indirect, for
the thesis that the remedial deference of the state school finance
decisions reflects pressures that are present in the federal courts as
well. Perhaps the best way to test this thesis is to examine those cases
in which the Supreme Court has established the principles governing
the remedial power of federal courts in institutional reform litigation.
The precedents seem inescapably ambivalent. On the one hand, there
is the principle enunciated in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenIntrg Board of
Education, that once the defendant officials have failed to act a court
may order broad relief. 139 For example, in Milliken v. Bradley II,H° the
Court upheld a desegregation order that went beyond pupil assign-
ment to include compensatory programs, teacher training, testing, and
counseling. On the other hand, there is a recurring notion of limits to
the federal judicial remedial power, even in this area. Thus, in Milliken
v. Bradley 1, 141 involving the same school district, the Court struck down
a multidistrict order that included school districts not found to have
discriminated. The opinion relied heavily on notions of local control
over educationm and cautioned against federal courts becoming de
facto legislatures and school superintendents.' 43
The same ambivalence can be found in two important 1990 cases
dealing with remedial power: Spallone v. United States'" and Missouri
v. jenkins. 145 Spallone grew out of a long-running judicial challenge to
racially segregated housing patterns in Yonkers, New York. After the
city failed to carry out housing reforms, to which it had agreed, the
155 Id. at 40-43.
13° Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,742-43 (1974) [hereinafter Milliken 11.
137 See Abbot v. Burke, 575 A.2r1 359,410 (NJ. 1990).
138 See, e.g., Warth v, Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (denying standing to plaintiffs seeking to
challenge exclusionary effects of suburban zoning ordinance).
159 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 403 U.S. 1,15 (1971).
140 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
141 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
142 Id. at 741-44.
145 Id. at 743-44.
144 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
145 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
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federal district court levied civil contempt penalties against it and
individual city councilors. The Supreme Court upheld the contempt
order against the city, 146 but held the individual orders invalid.' 47 The
majority relied primarily on principles of federal equity jurisprudence,
particularly notions of deference to state and local officials. 148 It also
found support in doctrines establishing the immunity of individual
legislators from suits arising out of performance of their duties.' 49 It
viewed the contempt order as interfering unduly with the decisionmak-
ing processes of individual legislators.'"
Missouri v. Jenkins saw judicial authority affirmed up to a point.
As part of a comprehensive desegregation order, a federal district court
had imposed a tax. The Supreme Court held that this action violated
principles of comity and equitable discretion.' 5 ' It upheld, however, a
modified version of the order under which the court would order the
necessary educational programs, direct the school district to levy the
taxes required to pay for them, and suspend the operation of any state
laws that would limit those taxes. 152 The majority apparently found a
significant difference between direct and indirect judicial imposition
of a tax, despite Justice Kennedy's characterization of it as a "conven-
ient formalism."'" Writing for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Scalia, Justice Kennedy denounced the order
as outside the judicial power and invoked Spallone as showing the
proper respect for limits on that power.'"
Taken together, the cases constitute support for broad federal
judicial power. Contempt against a city and indirect imposition of taxes
are valid remedies. It is also important to note that these remedies were
upheld in order to facilitate programmatic remedies concerning hous-
ing and education which were themselves quite sweeping. 155 Moreover,
there are strong indications in each opinion that the district court
could have ordered the invalidated relief if there was no other alter-
native to achieve the programmatic end.'" Still, the notion of limits is
148 Spallone, 493 U.S. at 276.
147 Id. at 280,
148 Id. at 278-80.
148 Id. at 278-79.
15° Id. at 280.
151 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50 (1990).
152 See id.
153 See id. at 64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 70,
153 lit Jenkins, the lower court had ordered an elaborate program of magnet schools with a
range of facilities and educational offerings. Id. at 39 n.5.
156 S„,	 Spallone v. U.S., 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (lower court should have proceeded
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very much present. Each case struck down judicial action. For Justice
Kennedy and his colleagues, at least, Spallone could be an important
building block in this direction. The four Justices who took this posi-
tion in Missouri v. Jenkins have since been joined by Justices Souter and
Thomas, a change in the Court which enhances the likelihood of
further concern for restraint. For the moment, however, the Swann
principle appears to remain the main remedial guidepost for federal
courts in complex institutional reform litigation. Once a constitutional
violation is established and the defendant officials have been given an
opportunity to redress it, those courts may continue to immerse them-
selves in all aspects of the remedy.
So far, the state courts have not taken a similar approach to school
finance litigation. It may be that continued legislative inaction will
push them to the federal model, but remedial deference is the norm
for now. Thus, on the specific level of remedies, the similarity thesis is
not a complete explanation of the state courts' actions. This does not
constitute a validation of the disparity thesis with its clear notions of
state court inferiority. It may well be that state courts are seeking the
same reformist goals as their federal counterparts, but that they have
chosen an alternative route toward playing a role in the achievement
of social change in a democratic society.
IV. STATE COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
LITIGATION-RESPONDING IN THEIR OWN VOICE
The state courts' repeated citations to Marbury v. Madisonl" show
that they view themselves as functioning as courts in the classic mode
of constitutional adjudication. At the same time, the frequent refer-
ences to the political question doctrinem show an awareness that they
are on the outer edge of what the judiciary can do. Reforming school
finance to produce quality education is a complex and controversial
issue. Social change of this nature will take a long time. It requires
enactment of legislation, and courts are hesitant to order legislatures
to act. As discussed above,'" the state courts' position as participants
in the political process makes them particularly reluctant to act. On
first with sanctions against the city alone and should only have considered individual sanctions
il' that approach failed).
157 See, e.g.,McDttify v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Ethic., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass.
1993) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803)).
158 See, e.g., Rose v, Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 225 (Ky. 1989) (Liebson,
J., dissenting) (case tionjusticiable under Baker v. Carr standards).
I" See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
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the other hand, they may well recognize that being integral parts of
that process gives them unique advantages when it comes to moving it
forward. 15° The school finance cases have emerged from this welter of
competing considerations. In this Section, 1 consider the possibility
that these cases represent the beginnings of a new approach to insti-
tutional reform suits, a different form of public law litigation.
Two key features of the cases are the emphasis on guidance and
the lack of direct involvement at the remedial stage. The latter point
has been discussed above, as well as the contrast between it and the
federal model. With respect to guidance, it is noteworthy that several
courts have emphasized that the case before them involved a request
for a declaratory judgment and that this device can play a special role
in cases of great public importance. 16' The courts seem to be telling
the legislatures something along the following lines: "Here is what you
are doing wrong, and here are some general thoughts on how to
correct it. We will not tell you what to do. We insist, however, that you
do something."
I have referred to these cases as binding advisory opinions. Several
of them include discussions of whether they are, in fact, advisory. 162
The state courts do not think that they are doing this. 163 However, the
line between declaratory judgments and advisory opinions is anything
but clear. This may be an area where state courts, unconstrained by
Article III of the United States Constitution,'" can be more flexible
than their federal counterparts. In the federal courts the declaratory
judgment is treated as one remedy among others available in a court
of general jurisdiction. 165 The goal of the federal declaratory judgment
is to make the parties aware of their rights and duties. It is one step in
the remedial process; the authorizing statute states clearly that the
160 See Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 10, at 1089.
161 See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 365 (1977).
162 See, e.g., Rase, 790 S.W.2d at 215.
'63 The fact that the state courts view these cases as traditional adversary litigation rather than
advisory opinion requests is shown by their emphasis on standing and the presence of proper
parties. See Washakie County. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316-17 (Wyo. 1980)
(requirement of standing screens out advisory opinions); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 941
(Cal. 1976) (discussion of proper parties); cf. Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 163 (NJ. 1976)
(Pacshman, J., dissenting) (consideration of recently enacted legislation on its face not an
advisory opinion).
164 See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (Article III might bar federal court from
considering constitutional issue even though state court could hear it because of important public
interest involved).
165 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982). This statute, authorizing the declaratory judgement., treats it
as a newly created remedy.
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plaintiff may return to court for further relief.'" In the school finance
cases, the state courts seem to see the declaration itself as their main
contribution to the controversy. The plaintiffs may be able to return
to court, but it is possible that all they will get is another declara-
tion. Even if more coercive relief is available—such as an injunction
against all school spending 1 "7—it is aimed less at remedying the par-
ticular plaintiffs' situation than at getting the legislature to do some-
thing about the general problem analyzed in the court's initial decla-
ration.
I do not contend that these are advisory opinions in the pure
sense of requests for judicial action on a hypothetical set of facts.' 68
Although several state constitutions permit advisory opinions in certain
circumstances,'" the cases do not arise under these provisions. They
differ from advisory opinions, as the concept is generally presented, in
that they are adversary proceedings brought by affected litigants based
on specific factual situations. On the other hand, the state courts
frequently proceed at a high level of generality, analyzing the problem
of the state's public education system, or groups of districts within that
system.' 7° The judgment does not point with much specificity at a
resolution of the particular fact situation that triggered it. The essential
function of the opinion is to advise the legislature on the constitutional
dimensions of an ongoing social problem.
According to Hart and Wechsler, one of the telling features of
advisory opinions is that a court moves away from its position as the
organ of "sober second thought" within the community whose function
it is to pass on what the legislature has done.' 7 ' Advisory opinions draw
the judiciary into a position of sharing front-line responsibility for
making those decisions. 172
 The school finance cases put the state courts
in precisely that position. The legislature must remedy the problem,
since the court will not, but it acts within the ambit of what the court
has told it and with an eye on the court's hovering presence. Indeed,
1111 28 U.S.C. § 2202 provides: "Further necessary or proper relief' based on a declaratory
judgement or decree may be granted, alter reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse
party whose rights have been determined by such judgement."
1117 Rottinscm III, 358 A.2d 457 (N,J. 1975).
11111 The classic example of such an advisory opinion is the letter from Thomas Jefferson,
Secretary or State, to Chief' justice Jay and Associate Justices, which is reproduced in 14Awr &
SUpTa note 88, at 65.
169 See id. at 70.
17°Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWhorter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 155 (1993).
171 HART &	 supra note 8H, at 68.
172 Id.
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the court may have timed its decision to provide maximum impetus to
the legislative process.'"
This situation puts the court in a difficult position if the matter
returns to it, a distinct possibility in school finance cases.' 74
 To the
extent that the legislature has tried to follow the court's advice, it will
be difficult to strike down that action. The court has diminished its
power by tipping its hand in the form of guidance. This problem has
surfaced in at least one school finance case.'" There are, however,
advantages to this judicial role. The court and the legislature can be
seen as establishing a dialogue on how to approach a deep-rooted
problem.'" Each branch performs the task it does best. The judiciary
elaborates broad legal standards; the legislature applies them to mat-
ters of taxation, spending and educational policy.
The court's main function is to get the process moving. Dean
Colin Diver has contended that this is a particularly appropriate role
for the judiciary in complex reform litigation.'" Indeed, it is possible
to view problems such as school finance as ones that the courts can
never resolve on their own. Real change acceptable to the citizenry at
large can only come from the legislature. In this view, the state courts'
remedial deference is the beginning of remedial wisdom. Perhaps the
school finance cases represent development of a new form of public
law litigation: the dialogic as opposed to the managerial model.'" The
state judiciary is taking a track different in two ways from the federal
judicial approach. They are less managerial and more advisory. The
federal trial courts, in particular, have shown ongoing commitment to
the managerial mode. The United States Supreme Court may have
doubts about this approach, 17" but its firm commitment to Article III
would cast doubt on an advisory role as well.
1 " See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State of Washington, 585 1'.2d 71, 111 n.14 (Wash. 1978)
(noting that legislature passed a new reform law while litigation pending in state supreme court).
174 See Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 10, at 1072 (discussing phenomenon of "second-round
challenges to school finance remedies").
175 Carrollton-Farmers Eiranch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d
489 (Tex. 1992) (reviewing and striking down statute passed in reliance on previous court
decision).
17" See Peter II. Shuck, Public. Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763, 1771-72
(1993) (discussing ''dialogic" nature of "interactions between courts, legislatures, agencies and
other social processes").
177
 Diver, supra note 132, at 79-82. Dean Diver asserts that the courts' role "is to stir the
governmental entities to action to make sure that issues are addressed and choices made, not to
make those choices itself." Ste id. at 92.
178 See generally Shuck, supra note 176.
1799
	 Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (district court in desegregation litigation
became both legislature and school superintendent).
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What the school finance cases represent is federalism at work. The
Supreme Court tossed the ball to the state courts in Rodriguez.m" Some
have declined to find for the plaintiffs on the underlying merits, but
there is a strong trend toward finding important education rights in
state constitutions, In providing remedies for these rights, state courts
tend to take a sharply different approach from the federal courts in
analogous circumstances. The situation is still evolving. What is tran-
spiring is a multi-faceted dialogue between state courts and legislatures,
across state judicial systems, and between these courts and the national
judiciary. The intrastate dimensions pose the most serious problems.
State courts may not be able to resolve the conflict between their
insistence on being the ultimate interpreters of the state constitutions
and their insistence on letting the legislature say how to effectuate the
guarantees in question. The school reform cases may push the judici-
ary too far into a political mode, lessening its legitimacy. The state
courts may ultimately revert to the federal, managerial model, with
diminished credibility to perform the task. At this stage of the process,
however, automatic preference for the federal model rests largely on
assumptions about the disparity thesis and about the efficiency of the
judicial process in achieving social change. Perhaps it is time to ques-
tion both assumptions.
CONCLUSION
McDuffi v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education'"' is an
important case in the overall national trend of state court derivation
of rights from the education clauses of state constitutions. Its remedial
dimensions are equally important. Like other state supreme courts,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court tempered considerably the
rights and duties found by relying primarily, if not exclusively, on the
legislature to remedy them. In pulling back from remedial issues, the
state courts manifest an approach to reform litigation that seems in
sharp contrast to the managerial model prevalent in the federal courts.
It is possible to view this contrast as symptomatic of a larger difference
between the two sets of courts; because of their dependence on the
electorate and closeness to the political process the state courts are less
capable of vigorous enforcement of individual rights than their federal
counterparts. In this view, school finance cases illustrate the disparity
18°41.1 U.S. I (1973). '['he holding in Rodriguez effectively eliminates any federal constitu-
tional claim for school finance plaintiffs. Thus, even those plaintiffs relying upon state equal
protection clauses are making state arguments only.
181 61 5 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
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thesis that dominates much federal courts literature. Alternatively, it is
possible to view the state courts as motivated by the same concerns for
judicial restraint that have characterized the United States Supreme
Court under Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist. The analysis in this
Article suggests that both explanations are plausible, but that they do
not tell the whole story. In the school finance cases, we see the state
courts embarking on their own road to institutional reform. Their
deference to the legislative branch in matters of remedy reflects, as
much as anything, their considered judgment about how to achieve
social reform over the long-term. A sympathetic understanding of their
dialogic approach is appropriate, particularly at this early phase of the
process.
